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BOOK REVIEWS
MARTAL PRoPmzY iN CONFLICT op LAWS, by Harold Marsh, Jr. Seattle: The Univer-
sity of Washington Press, 1952. Pp. 263. $4.50.
If a childless husband and wife have lived in New York and there acquired property
during their marriage, the wife is entitled to a nonbarrable one-half share. If the child-
less husband and wife have lived in Washington and acquired property during their
marriage, the wife has one half as her community interest, not subject to disposition
by the will of the husband. But if these persons have acquired the property in New
York during their marriage and thereafter have changed their domicile to Washington
and the husband at his death has left a will bequeathing all "his" property to a third
person, does the wife have any claim which she can successfully assert? If the Wash-
ington court regards the property as "separate" property of the husband-and it might
be so described in New York where the parties were domiciled at the date of acquisi-
tion-and further regards the claim of the wife as a problem of "succession"---to be
governed by the law of the domicile at the time of the husband's death-the result
would be that the wife would be denied any claim. "This procedure is, of- course," says
Mr. Marsh, "merely characterization by the lex causae, or double characterization of
the issue-an exploded theory in conflict of laws. Such a result is clearly both illogical
and unjust, and a correct analysis of the problem does not support it."1
The avowed purpose of MARITAL PRoPERT IN ComNLICT OF LAws is to demon-
strate the "correct analysis" for the problem above and a host of similar intriguing
choice-of-law questions involving marital property. Laid out between the covers of this
comparatively thin volume is as fine a study, as lucid an explanation, and as great a
number of practical guideposts for the rational solution of these problems as has yet
been made available. The value of the work to the practicing attorney is considerably
enhanced by the author's careful attention to the statutes and cases, a welcome change
of fare from the too prevalent generalized and theoretical discussions to which resort
must normally be made.
Because much of the difficulty in this area of law is basically semantic, the author
wisely devotes an entire chapter to definition of terms employed to designate marital
property. The precise interest of one spouse in property acquired by the other cannot
be adequately described by labels until such labels are understood in light of the
"actual rights, powers, privileges, and immunities, which arise in favor of the non-
acquiring spouse." Chapter II undertakes analysis of such interests by painstaking
dissection of the phrases "separate property" and "community property" into such
phrases as "statutory separate property," "civil-law separate property," "community
property acquired by the husband," and "community property acquired by the wife,"
and then doggedly pursues the meaning of these phrases with reference to real and pet-
sonal property, acquired. before or after marriage, in common law or community
property jurisdictions, in every obvious type of transaction. The result is somewhat
comparable to a limited, vest-pocket edition of Vernier's, AmmucAN FAmLY LAWS.
In this chapter the text is fairly slow, dull reading-but of prime importance if the
following pages are to be meaningful.
Nor is the reader permitted to view the law in action when the definitions have been
Page 233. That the problem is not moot nor the result unlikely is amply demon-
strated by the author's discussion of an analogous case, In re O'Connor's Estate, 218
Calif. 518, 23 P. 2d 1031 (1933).
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mastered. First he must refresh his understanding of the procedure in a conflicts case.
There are, the reader learns, three steps in the choice-of-law decision: characterization
of the issue before the court, selection of the jurisdiction whose law is to govern the
issue, and application of the law of that jurisdiction. It is here that the author consid-
ers the basic problems in Conflict of Laws and the various theories advanced for their
solution. This chapter (the third) is the talisman to the "correct analysis" by which
the basic policies and social purposes of the rules and principles are to be preserved.
Somehow the author manages to keep on a comprehensible and helpful plane what
might quickly deteriorate into a technically complex quarrel over theory. Only rarely
does the discussion approach something resembling an argument over how many angels
can dance simultaneously on the head of a pin. His premises and conclusions are logic-
ally advanced; theories antecedent and opposed to his own are dealt with sharply,
sometimes scathingly, always with the vigor of one convinced that he is indeed exor-
cising the "devil of illogical thought." What Marsh has to say in this chapter will be
of interest to any lawyer with a conflicts question, whether in the area of marital
property or not, because the approach should be usable for any situation in which a
choice-of-law problem appears.
When the second and third chapters have been digested, the remaining pages are a
pleasant jaunt through already familiar terrain for the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters
are simply detailed examination of the three step characterization-selection-application
technique developed above, one chapter for each. Marsh obviously enjoys himself in
these chapters, and he has a right to, for the cases provide persuasive documentation
for his thesis that his suggestions are far more plausible than what most courts thus
far have had to offer. Why a creditor, who could satisfy a judgment resulting from
post-nuptial contractual liability incurred by the husband in the course of ordinary
business from post-nuptial earnings of the husband in either Wisconsin or Washington
if the entire transaction (obligation-judgment-execution) occurred in either state,
should not be able to maintain the same sort of levy in Washington on a Wisconsin
judgment ;2 and why Plaintiff A, struck by an auto negligently driven by husband on
"community business" ten feet inside the Washington boundary line, could levy on
community property to satisfy a judgment, while Plaintiff B, struck ten feet on the
Oregon side of the line could not do so;3 are pretty clearly instances bearing out the
theme that all- is not well with the present choice-of-law cases.
Among other virtues of the book, a particularly significant one is the cross intro-
duction to and comparison of the common law and community property marital prop-
erty systems. It is gratifying to have a writer well enough informed in both systems
to appreciate the fact that both have strength and weakness, and able to resist the
temptation to subject either to derision. Some community property trained lawyers will
be disappointed by the author's insistence that Washington and Arizona have a "com-
munity entity" in fact rather than merely as a matter of expression, but Marsh's mis-
apprehension here-if such it actually is-must certainly be forgiven in light of the
numerous decisions using "entity" language.
In final appraisal the book seems too light in one area only; the failure adequately
to consider what progress toward solution of these problems can be made by legisla-
tion. Possibly the author is convinced that attempts at uniformity by legislation would
fail because of the deep set local prejudices surrounding marital property questions.
His own passing discussion at several points of legislative reform in California would
2 La Salle v. Woolery, 11 Wash. 337, 39 Pac. 663 (1895), rev'd on rehearing, 14
Wash. 70, 44 Pac. 115 (1896).
3 A hypothetical case posed by the author on page 153. His hypothetical is sug-
gested, however, by analogous case authority which he cites.
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seem partial refutation of this idea. More probably he did not consider this possibility
to be fairly within the scope of his conflict of laws study. The thought of legislative
correction is mentioned here because Marsh's book not only demonstrates the need for
"correct analysis" of the choice-of-law questions but also rather vividly portrays the
many pitfalls which must be avoided, and inferentially raises the question whether
such a hazardous route is advisable if a safer, simpler alternative is available.
LuvFRx V. RiEKs*
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington.
